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Petitioner and Appellant in Pro Per

**COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT**

LAURA OWENS,
Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL MARRACCINI,
Respondent.

**Court of Appeal No. A175236
(San Francisco County Superior Court
No. FDV-18-813693, Hon. Carolyn
Gold)**

**APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR
LEAVE TO FILE REPLY; REPLY IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
AUGMENT
AND CORRECT THE RECORD ON
APPEAL**

*[Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.54,
8.155, 8.252; Code Civ. Proc.,
§§ 909, 128]*

*Motion filed July 13, 2026
Opposition filed July 24, 2026*

REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO FILE REPLY

Appellant respectfully requests leave to file the accompanying reply. California Rules of Court, rule 8.54 provides for a motion and an opposition and does not expressly provide for a reply; Appellant therefore seeks the Court's permission rather than assuming a right to file one. Because rule 8.54(b)(1) permits the Court to rule at any time after an opposition is filed, Appellant files this request promptly, and asks that the Court consider it before ruling.

Good cause exists principally because the opposition makes factual assertions that Respondent's own filings in the superior court contradict, and those filings are not before this Court. Three examples illustrate the point.

First, the opposition tells this Court that Appellant's statement that the superior court was holding July 20, 2026 for a possible refiling of the fee motion “is incorrect,” and that “[t]here is no such calendar setting.” (Opp., pp. 4, 8–9.) The document that resolves the question did not exist when Appellant filed. Appellant filed her motion on July 13, 2026. Four days later, on July 17, 2026, Respondent filed in the superior court a Notice to Vacate stating that “Department 405A nonetheless continued to hold July 20, 2026, at 9:00 a.m. open on the Court's internal calendar pending possible refiling of the Fee Motion,” and asking that the date be “remove[d] ... from the Court's calendar.” (RJN, Ex. 2, ¶¶ 2, 4.)

On July 13, Appellant could describe the July 20 date only as it then stood. The filing that changed its status, and that contains Respondent's first statement that he would not refile, did not exist for another four days. Neither that notice nor the current register is before this Court, which is why Appellant submits them by the concurrent request for judicial notice.

Second, the opposition presents the fee motion as having been resolved on May 7, 2026. (Opp., pp. 4, 8–9.) Respondent's May 7 notice withdrew the motion expressly “without prejudice to refiling” and said nothing about whether he would refile; his first statement that he “will not be refiling the Fee Motion” appears in the July 17 notice, after Appellant's motion was filed. (RJN, Exs. 2–3.)

Third, the opposition states that Appellant “was ordered to appear in person, was told the evening before that the matter ‘remains on calendar’ ... and did not appear.” (Opp., pp. 7–8.) It does not disclose that Appellant was

admitted to a hospital in the early morning hours of November 5, that she notified the court and all counsel twice before the hearing, that she offered HIPAA authorizations so her condition could be verified, or that court staff acknowledged both notifications in writing. Respondent does not dispute these facts, and he acknowledges receiving the communications. (Marraccini Decl., ¶ 6.)

The opposition is also supported by a declaration making assertions about matters outside the record, including the status of the superior court's calendar. (Marraccini Decl., ¶¶ 3–6.) Where an opposition rests on extra-record declarations, a short reply and an accompanying request for judicial notice assist rather than burden the Court.

The reply is brief, responds only to matters raised in the opposition, and seeks no additional briefing or extension of any deadline. The Court's July 15, 2026 order reset Appellant's opening-brief deadline to run from the ruling on this motion, so considering the reply delays nothing and prejudices no one.

REPLY

I. INTRODUCTION

Respondent does not dispute the authenticity or accuracy of a single document Appellant asks this Court to place in the record. He does not deny that the superior court sent the November 4, 2025 reporter email; that Appellant responded with a written non-waiver and a written objection; that she twice notified the court on the morning of November 5 that she had been hospitalized and could not appear; that she offered to execute HIPAA authorizations so her condition could be verified; or that the court's own staff

acknowledged both notifications in writing before the hearing. He confirms that he “was a recipient of the November 4 and 5, 2025 email communications described in Appellant's motion.” (Marraccini Decl., ¶ 6.)

His objection is that these documents, though received by the superior court and acted upon by it, were transmitted by email rather than file-stamped. That is a reason to choose the correct procedural vehicle for placing them in the record. It is not a reason to keep from this Court the only materials that explain why the appellant did not appear at the hearing that ended her domestic violence restraining order.

Respondent also agrees that the November 5, 2025 minute order—the order appealed from, which Appellant designated (3 CT 714) but which the clerk omitted—should be added, and he “does not oppose, and affirmatively supports, completing the record” with it. (Opp., pp. 6–7, 11.) Appellant accepts that concession. And Respondent repeatedly represents that Appellant's account of the November 4–5 events is “already visible on the face of the record” through her December 3, 2025 motion and declaration (3 CT 680–706); in his words, “[t]he Court reviewing the dismissal can see precisely what Appellant contends the superior court received and when.” (Opp., pp. 2, 10.) Respondent cannot simultaneously urge that these facts are plainly in the record and that this Court must be prevented from considering the primary documents that establish them.

Two preliminary clarifications are in order. Respondent correctly observes that California Rules of Court, rule 8.340 governs the record in criminal appeals. Appellant's citation to that rule was inadvertent, and she does not rely upon it; her requests rest on rule 8.155, Code of Civil Procedure sections 128 and 909, and rule 8.252.

Respondent also observes that the clerk's transcript runs 718 pages in three volumes. (Opp., p. 2.) Appellant does not contend otherwise. Her contention concerns the record of the November 5, 2025 proceeding itself, the hearing at which her request was dismissed and her protective order dissolved. That proceeding is memorialized by a five-page reporter's transcript, of which approximately two pages reflect the proceedings, and a minute entry stating that “No Order is prepared for today's hearing.” Neither mentions the medical emergency the superior court had been told of twice and had acknowledged in writing that morning. The size of the clerk's transcript does not cure that omission.

II. ARGUMENT

A. The Court should order the November 5, 2025 minute order added, as Respondent does not oppose.

Respondent agrees that the minute order was designated by Appellant (3 CT 714), is a required component of the clerk's transcript (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.122(b)(1)(D)), and was omitted from the transcript as transmitted; he supports completing the record with it under rule 8.155(b)(1) or rule 8.155(a)(1)(A). (Opp., pp. 6–7, 11.) The Court should so order.

B. The November 4–5 communications should be placed in the record, by whichever vehicle the Court finds appropriate.

Respondent's principal argument is that rule 8.155(a)(1)(A) reaches only documents “filed or lodged in the case in superior court,” and that emails sent to a department inbox are neither. Appellant respectfully submits that the answer does not turn on that label alone, and that at least four independent grounds support the relief requested.

First, the materials were before the superior court in every sense that matters. The court sent one of them, received the others, replied to two of them in writing, and acted on the subject matter by proceeding with the

hearing. Rule 8.155 exists so that the reviewing court sees what the trial court saw. Reading “lodged” to exclude documents the court itself transmitted and answered would elevate a filing formality over the function the rule serves.

Respondent's authorities mark the boundary of the rule; they do not reach this case. In *Lewis v. YouTube, LLC* (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, the appellant sought to add a declaration she drafted for the first time on appeal, a document that had never existed in the superior court in any form, offered in a jury-triable damages action to reverse a judgment on facts she concededly knew before she filed her complaint. In *Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc.* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, footnote 3, the moving party sought to add deposition testimony taken after judgment and manuals never presented to the trial court, to relitigate the facts. Those cases prevent a party from manufacturing on appeal a record the trial court never saw. Neither addresses documents the trial court itself sent, received, and answered in writing before it ruled.

Second, rule 8.155(c) authorizes this Court to “order the correction ... of any part of the record” and to direct the superior court to settle disputes about omissions. A record that omits the communications the trial court received and acknowledged on the morning it dismissed the case is incomplete in a respect that matters, and correction is available.

Third, the Court may direct that the materials be deemed lodged as of the dates they were received. Respondent's own authorities support that relief. In *Carpenter v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co.* (1939) 14 Cal.2d 704, the Supreme Court affirmed a nunc pro tunc correction not of a judgment but of the clerk's minute entry—made by the trial court on its own motion, without notice, years after the entry—explaining that courts of record “have inherent power to make a correction, nunc pro tunc or

otherwise, of clerical errors and misprisions in their records, in order that such records conform to the facts and speak the truth,” and that such “corrections may be made at any time.” (*Id.* at p. 707.) *Estate of Eckstrom* (1960) 54 Cal.2d 540 says the same: “It cannot be denied that there is both an inherent and a statutory right for a court to cause its acts and proceedings to be correctly set forth in its records.” (*Id.* at p. 547.) And *Machado v. Myers* (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 779, 797 locates the clerical/judicial line in “whether the error was made in rendering the judgment, or in recording the judgment rendered.” (Quoting *Rochin v. Pat Johnson Mfg. Co.* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.)

What those cases forbid is altering the substance of what a court decided under a clerical label—a final probate decree in *Eckstrom*, a merits ruling in *Morgan*, a judgment under section 664.6 in *Machado*. Appellant asks for nothing of that kind here. The relief sought by this motion would alter no ruling; it asks only that documents actually delivered to the superior court on identified dates be reflected as having been delivered on those dates—recording, not rendering. Whether the dismissal itself should stand is the question presented by the appeal, and it is precisely so that this Court can decide that question on a complete record that Appellant brings this motion. That result accords with the policy expressed in rule 1.20(a): “Unless otherwise provided, a document is deemed filed on the date it is received by the court clerk.” Under Respondent's own authorities, making the record “speak the truth” of what the court received, and when it received it, is precisely the function the power serves.

Fourth, Code of Civil Procedure section 909 and rule 8.252 permit this Court to take evidence when the interests of justice require. That the power is reserved for exceptional circumstances is not a reason to deny it here; it is a reason to examine whether this case presents such circumstances.

It does: Appellant was denied an official court reporter over her written objection and express non-waiver; her objection was never ruled upon; the hearing proceeded with a reporter privately retained by her opponent, selected in communications from which she was excluded; and the ordinary safeguard against an incomplete record was therefore unavailable to her through no fault of her own. A record deficiency an appellant objected to in advance, in writing, and was powerless to prevent is the paradigm case for the Court's corrective powers.

C. Respondent's opposition does not address the reason the record is deficient: Appellant was denied an official court reporter over her written objection and express non-waiver.

The opposition is notable for what it does not discuss. It does not mention Government Code section 68086, California Rules of Court, rule 2.956, Appellant's non-waiver, or her written objection of November 4, 2025. Yet that is the origin of the deficiency this motion seeks to cure.

Respondent's own statement of facts confirms the recurring problem: he acknowledges that the October 21, 2025 hearing “was continued because no court reporter was available.” (Opp., p. 3.) The same problem arose on November 4, when the superior court advised the parties there was “a high chance” of no reporter coverage and that, because this was a DVRO trial, “the court needs to continue the trial if any party doesn't waive the court reporter.” Appellant did not waive.

The sequence that followed is itself part of what the record should show. At 3:42 p.m. on November 4, Respondent's counsel advised the court he had “successfully secured a court reporter,” in an email on which Appellant was not copied. At 4:08 p.m., court staff replied—again without Appellant—that “[t]he Court will accept the certified court reporter,” and asked counsel to “provide the name and CSR# for the reporter you are

proposing.” At 4:25 p.m., Appellant objected in writing, invoking “procedural due process violations and good cause under Gov. Code § 68086(d)(2) and Cal. Rule of Court 2.956(c)(1),” and asking the court to “vacate the appointment” and “continue the matter until an official court reporter employed or appointed directly by the Court is available.” At 4:49 p.m., the court responded only that the matter “remains on calendar” and that the parties were “to appear as previously court ordered.” Only at 5:10 p.m. —after the objection—did counsel identify the proposed reporter by name and license number. The objection was never ruled upon.

That context also answers Respondent's invocation of *Jameson v. Desta* (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594. Respondent cites *Jameson* for the proposition that the burden of an adequate record rests on the appellant. (Opp., pp. 7, 10.) But *Jameson* itself concerned a litigant deprived of an official court reporter by court policy. The Supreme Court held for that litigant, emphasizing “the absence of a court reporter at trial court proceedings and the resulting lack of a verbatim record of such proceedings will frequently be fatal to a litigant's ability to have his or her claims of trial court error resolved on the merits,” and the “realistic, crucial importance” of a verbatim record to “equal access to appellate justice.” (*Id.* at p. 608.) It held the resulting deficiency could not be found harmless, and reversed. The adequate-record doctrine *Jameson* recites at pages 608 to 609 is the harm the Court acted to prevent, not a rule it enforced against the litigant who lacked the record. A rule charging an appellant with record deficiencies she objected to in writing, and was powerless to prevent, would invert the holding.

D. The November 5, 2025 minute order should be corrected to reflect what the superior court had received and acknowledged.

Respondent argues that the minute order is accurate and that adding to it would be a judicial act. (Opp., pp. 7–8.) Appellant does not ask this

Court to insert findings the superior court never made, or to state what that court concluded. She asks that the record reflect two undisputed, objectively verifiable facts: that before the matter was called, the court had received Appellant's two medical-emergency notifications, and that its staff acknowledged them in writing at 7:11 a.m. and 7:33 a.m. Those are events, not conclusions.

Respondent's own framing shows why this matters. He writes that Appellant “was ordered to appear in person, was told the evening before that the matter ‘remains on calendar’ ... and did not appear.” (Opp., pp. 7–8.) That sentence is accurate as far as it goes, and incomplete in exactly the way the minute order is. It omits that Appellant's family purchased air travel that evening so she could appear; that she was admitted to a hospital in the early morning hours of November 5 and underwent surgery under anesthesia the next day; that she notified the court and all counsel twice before the 9:00 a.m. hearing; that she offered in writing to execute HIPAA authorizations so the court and opposing counsel could verify her condition; and that court staff acknowledged both notifications in writing. Respondent disputes none of it, and neither he nor the court requested the verification Appellant offered. When the omitted facts are supplied, “did not appear” means something materially different. If the Court concludes that correction of the minute entry is better made below, Appellant asks in the alternative that the superior court be directed to settle the record under rule 8.155(c).

E. Appellant's hospital records should be received under section 909.

Respondent argues that Exhibits C and D cannot be added because the After Visit Summary was generated on November 6, 2025, the day after the ruling. (Opp., pp. 5–6.) The argument proves too much. The reason no discharge summary existed on the morning of November 5 is that Appellant was, at that moment, in the hospital. A litigant admitted through an

emergency department hours before a hearing cannot produce her discharge records before that hearing. If the date of the documentation defeated its use, no medical emergency arising on the morning of a hearing could ever be documented on appeal.

The date a record is printed is not the date of the events it records. Exhibits C and D document an admission to the HonorHealth SSMC Med/Surg unit that began in the early morning hours of November 5—before the 9:00 a.m. hearing—for hematemesis, an overnight hospitalization, and a surgical case completed the next day. They corroborate precisely what Appellant told the superior court before it ruled.

Appellant's own words on the morning of the hearing dispose of the objection. She told the superior court and all counsel that she could “provide medical documentation confirming this as soon as it becomes available,” and that she was “more than willing to execute HIPAA releases ... for the Court and opposing counsel regarding my visit to the hospital.” She thus said, in advance and in writing, exactly what Respondent now complains of: that the documentation would follow, and that she would authorize its release to him and to the court. Neither the court nor Respondent's counsel asked for it.

Respondent cannot decline an offered verification and then object that the verification, once it existed, came too late. Section 909 and rule 8.252 permit this Court to receive the records, and the Supreme Court reaffirmed only recently that “appellate factfinding under Code of Civil Procedure section 909 is proper when exceptional circumstances are shown.” (*In re Kenneth D.* (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, the very authority on which Respondent relies.) The interests of justice favor receiving the records here, where the fact they corroborate—that Appellant was hospitalized and undergoing treatment when the superior court dismissed her case for not appearing—is

the central question this appeal presents, and where the records are documentary, generated by a third-party hospital, and undisputed as to authenticity.

F. The fee-motion papers were filed in the superior court and are properly included.

Unlike the emails, the April 29/May 4, 2026 fee motion, its supporting exhibits, the May 7, 2026 withdrawal papers, and the “Procedural Posture Correction” were filed in the superior court. Augmentation with filed documents is squarely authorized by rule 8.155(a)(1)(A), and Respondent identifies no rule that excludes them.

Respondent argues they are irrelevant because they postdate the order under review. But they are offered for what followed from that order, not to relitigate it: a \$109,633.98 fee demand arising from the dismissed proceeding, withdrawn “without prejudice to refiling,” supported by a billing statement and a witness declaration whose defects Appellant documented in writing before the withdrawal. What weight, if any, to accord them is for this Court to determine. Appellant asks only that they travel with the record.

G. Appellant's statement about the July 20, 2026 hearing was accurate when made.

Appellant addresses Respondent's contention that her motion rested on a “false premise” only because it impugns her candor. The two statements are nearly identical. Appellant's motion stated that “the Court is holding July 20, 2026 for its refiling.” (Mot., p. 12.) Respondent's July 17, 2026 notice states that Department 405A “nonetheless continued to hold July 20, 2026, at 9:00 a.m. open on the Court's internal calendar pending possible refiling of the Fee Motion.” (RJN, Ex. 2, ¶ 2.) Respondent characterizes the former as false while his own filing states the latter.

The chronology, drawn entirely from the superior court's register and Respondent's own filings, is not in dispute:

May 4, 2026 — Respondent files the fee motion; the superior court sets a hearing for July 20, 2026 in Department 405A. (RJN, Ex. 1.)

May 7, 2026 — Respondent withdraws the motion “without prejudice to refiling” and states that the July 20 hearing “is taken off calendar.” He says nothing about whether he will refile. (RJN, Ex. 3.)

May 7 – July 16, 2026 — Notwithstanding that notice, Department 405A “continue[s] to hold July 20, 2026, at 9:00 a.m. open on the Court's internal calendar pending possible refiling of the Fee Motion.” (RJN, Ex. 2, ¶ 2.)

July 13, 2026 — Appellant files her motion to augment and correct the record, stating that “the Court is holding July 20, 2026 for its refiling.” (Mot., p. 12.) That statement was accurate on the date it was made.

July 17, 2026 — Respondent files his Notice to Vacate, asks the court to “remove [the July 20 date] from the Court's calendar,” and states for the first time that he “will not be refiling the Fee Motion.” The register reflects the hearing vacated that day. (RJN, Exs. 1–2.)

July 24, 2026 — Respondent's opposition asserts that “[t]here is no such calendar setting” and that Appellant's statement “is incorrect.” (Opp., pp. 4, 8–9.)

Appellant's motion preceded the vacatur by four days. When she filed, the fee motion had been withdrawn “without prejudice to refiling,” the July 20 date was being held open pending that possibility, and Respondent had never said he would not refile. She could not have known otherwise, because Respondent had not yet stated otherwise.

H. Section 473 is not an exclusive remedy, and Appellant's appeal could not safely have been deferred.

Respondent contends that Appellant should have moved to vacate the dismissal under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), rather than appeal. (Opp., p. 8.) That contention fails for three reasons.

First, section 473(b) is permissive. It provides that a court “may” relieve a party from a dismissal taken through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Nothing in it is exclusive of the appellate remedy or withdraws this Court's authority under rule 8.155(c) or section 909.

Second, Appellant did seek relief in the superior court. On December 3, 2025 she filed there a Motion to Correct and Augment the Record with a supporting declaration setting out the events of November 4 and 5. (3 CT 680–706.) That motion was pending when she filed her notice of appeal the next day. The time to appeal is jurisdictional and cannot be extended; had Appellant deferred her appeal to litigate a section 473 motion to conclusion, she would have risked forfeiting appellate review altogether. It is not a fair criticism that a self-represented litigant preserved the remedy that could be lost rather than the one that could not.

Third, section 473(b) would not have supplied what this motion seeks. That statute addresses relief from the dismissal; it does not determine what this Court may consider in reviewing it.

I. Appellant has pursued correction of the record diligently, and good cause excuses any delay.

Respondent invokes *People v. Preslie* (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 486 for the proposition that a motion to augment should be made promptly and that delay must be justified. Three observations about that authority are warranted before turning to the merits of the contention. *Preslie* was a criminal appeal

from a murder conviction, and its promptness discussion rests expressly on the former rules governing criminal appeals, in which “the emphasis is upon expediting the disposition of the appeals.” (*Id.* at p. 491.) Respondent elsewhere faults Appellant for citing a criminal-appeals rule. The current rule provides that the reviewing court may order augmentation “[a]t any time” (rule 8.155(a)(1)), and the Advisory Committee Comment to the rule explains that whether the motion was made within a reasonable time is “among the factors the reviewing court may consider”—a factor, not a bar. And what *Preslie* actually condemned was an informal request buried in the briefs, supported by uncertified attachments; it denied that request without prejudice to renewal by noticed motion, the very procedure Appellant has followed here. In any event, Appellant satisfies any promptness standard.

Appellant sought correction of the record from the outset. She moved to correct and augment in the superior court on December 3, 2025, the day before her notice of appeal, and that motion and declaration are in the clerk’s transcript. (3 CT 680–706.) She obtained two extensions of her briefing deadline for the express purpose of continuing to pursue correction of the record, as the opposition acknowledges. (Opp., p. 4 [first extension granted “on her representation that she needed the time to pursue correction of the record”].) She sought correction in the superior court again in June 2026 (RJN, Ex. 1 [motion filed June 8, 2026]); and after the superior court clerk directed her on July 9, 2026 to file “with the reviewing court — Court of Appeal,” she filed this motion here four days later. The superior court’s own Certification Notice had directed that “corrections of the record and Augmentations are to be made pursuant to ... rule 8.155 and Local Rule 7 of the Court of Appeal.” Appellant pursued this relief continuously and was redirected among forums by the courts themselves. In all events, this Court’s

July 15, 2026 order—resetting the opening-brief deadline to run from the ruling on this motion—confirms that no party is prejudiced by the timing.

Nor is Respondent's premise—that Appellant's superior court filings were a “detour to a court she knew lacked jurisdiction”—correct. The very case Respondent cites, *Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, recognizes that an appeal stays proceedings only “upon the matters embraced” in or “affected” by the order appealed from, and “does not stay proceedings on ‘ancillary or collateral matters which do not affect the judgment [or order] on appeal.’” (*Id.* at pp. 189–191; Code Civ. Proc., § 916, subd. (a).) The contents of the court's own records are the paradigm of a collateral matter: the power to correct clerical errors in a court's records “is unaffected by the pendency of an appeal” (*In re Candelario* (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705), and rule 8.155(b) and (c) themselves contemplate superior court clerks and judges preparing, certifying, and settling the record while the appeal is pending. A self-represented litigant who sought record correction in the court whose record it is, after that court's own Certification Notice pointed her to rule 8.155, was not maneuvering around the appellate rules; she was complying with the directions the courts themselves had provided.

III. CONCLUSION

Appellant respectfully requests that the Court grant leave to file this reply and grant the motion: (1) ordering the November 5, 2025 minute order added to the record, which Respondent does not oppose; (2) placing the November 4–5, 2025 communications and the superior court's two written acknowledgments in the record, whether by augmentation, by directing the superior court to settle and correct the record under rule 8.155(c), by ordering them deemed lodged as of the dates received, or by receiving them under Code of Civil Procedure section 909 and rule 8.252; (3) correcting the

November 5, 2025 minute order, or directing the superior court to settle the record, to reflect the court's pre-hearing receipt and written acknowledgment of Appellant's medical-emergency notifications and her written non-waiver and objection concerning the court reporter; (4) receiving Appellant's hospital records under section 909; and (5) augmenting the record with the fee-motion papers filed in the superior court.

Should the Court decline any portion of this relief, Appellant respectfully requests that the denial be without prejudice to her citation, in her opening brief, of her December 3, 2025 motion and declaration contained in the clerk's transcript (3 CT 680–706) and the register of actions (1 CT 4–13), the materials Respondent himself describes as making Appellant's account “already visible on the face of the record.” (Opp., pp. 2, 10.)

Dated: July 25, 2026

/s/ Laura Michelle Owens
Laura Michelle Owens
Petitioner and Appellant, In Pro Per

STATE OF CALIFORNIA California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District	<i>PROOF OF SERVICE</i> STATE OF CALIFORNIA California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District
Case Name: L.O. v. Marraccini	
Case Number: A175236	
Lower Court Case Number: FDV18813693	

1. At the time of service I was at least 18 years of age and not a party to this legal action.

2. My email address used to e-serve: **laura@lauramichelleowens.com**

3. I served by email a copy of the following document(s) indicated below:

Title(s) of papers e-served:

Filing Type	Document Title
PROOF OF SERVICE - PROOF OF SERVICE	Proof of Service
REQUEST - REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE	Request for Judicial Notice
MOTION - MOTION	Appellant's Request for Leave to File Reply; Reply in Support of Motion to Augment and Correct the Record on Appeal

Service Recipients:

Person Served	Email Address	Type	Date / Time
Laura Owens		e-Serve	7/25/2026 6:01:09 PM
Michael Marraccini		e-Serve	7/25/2026 6:01:09 PM

This proof of service was automatically created, submitted and signed on my behalf through my agreements with TrueFiling and its contents are true to the best of my information, knowledge, and belief.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

7/25/2026

Date

/s/Laura Owens

Signature

Owens, Laura (Pro Per)

Last Name, First Name (PNum)

Law Firm