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Petitioner and Appellant in Pro Per

**COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT**

LAURA OWENS,
Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL MARRACCINI,
Respondent.

**Court of Appeal No. A175236
(San Francisco County Superior Court No.
FDV-18-813693, Hon. Carolyn Gold)**

**APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
AUGMENT AND CORRECT THE
RECORD ON APPEAL;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES**

*[Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.155,
8.340, 8.252; Code Civ. Proc.,
§§ 909, 128]*

*Appeal from the November 5, 2025
order of dismissal, San Francisco
County Superior Court, Dept. 405A,
Hon. Carolyn Gold*

Appellant respectfully requests that this motion be considered on the papers and on an expedited basis, as her opening brief is due July 29, 2026 and the relief sought concerns the contents of the record on which that brief must be based.

MOTION

**TO THE PRESIDING JUSTICE AND ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF
APPEAL, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT:**

Appellant Laura Owens respectfully moves this Court, under California Rules of Court, rules 8.155 and 8.340, and Code of Civil Procedure sections 909 and 128, for an order augmenting and correcting the record on appeal from the November 5, 2025 order dismissing her request to renew a domestic violence restraining order against Respondent Michael

Marraccini. Appellant requests that the motion be decided on the papers, without oral argument, and on an expedited basis.

This motion is directed to this Court because the superior court did not accept it for filing. Appellant first sought this relief in the San Francisco County Superior Court on June 7, 2026. After that initial submission—in which the motion was accepted but the supporting declaration and exhibits were rejected on an electronic-filing formatting ground—Appellant corrected the formatting and resubmitted; then, on July 9, 2026, more than a month after her original submission, the clerk rejected the motion with the direction: “Please file your motion with the reviewing court — Court of Appeal.” (Owens Decl. ¶ 30.) Appellant accordingly brings the motion here.

The motion is made on the grounds that the record on appeal—consisting of a five-page reporter’s transcript and a single-paragraph minute order—omits the written communications that explain the dismissal, including Appellant’s pre-hearing medical-emergency notifications and the superior court’s own written acknowledgments of them; that no final order was ever prepared; and that, unless the record is augmented and corrected, this Court will be asked to review the dismissal on a record that reflects only an unexplained non-appearance, in violation of Appellant’s right to meaningful appellate review.

The motion is based on this motion and the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities; the Declaration of Laura Owens and Exhibits A–D thereto, filed concurrently and consecutively paginated; the record and files in this appeal and in the superior court action; and any further matters the Court may consider.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

On the morning of November 5, 2025, Appellant Laura Owens was in a hospital bed at HonorHealth in Scottsdale, Arizona, being treated for gastrointestinal bleeding after a night of vomiting blood. Before the 9:00 a.m. hearing on her request to renew her domestic violence

restraining order, she emailed the superior court and counsel for Respondent Michael Marraccini to explain that she had been admitted and could not appear, and she offered HIPAA releases so the court and opposing counsel could verify her condition directly with the hospital. Court staff confirmed receipt in writing—twice. At 9:26 a.m., the court dismissed the renewal request because Appellant was “not present” and dissolved the temporary order protecting her. She remained hospitalized overnight and underwent surgery under anesthesia the next day.

This Court will find none of that in the record. The reporter's transcript of the hearing runs five pages and contains no mention of the emergency, the emails, or the court's acknowledgments. The minute order is equally silent, and no final order was ever prepared—the minute entry itself states, “No Order is prepared for today's hearing.” The explanation for Appellant's absence exists, but it exists in emails the superior court sent, received, and answered, and in hospital records—materials that were transmitted by email rather than filed, and so were never placed in the court file.

Respondent's lead counsel, Omar Serrato, has described the consequence candidly. Thirteen days after the dismissal he said on camera that, “[l]uckily,” because no record was made, Appellant's “options for appeal are severely limited. An uphill battle for her.” (Owens Decl. ¶ 28.) He was right that the record is thin; he is wrong that it must stay that way. This Court has the authority to complete it.

Appellant does not ask this Court to decide the merits of her appeal. She asks only that the record reflect what the superior court actually received, sent, and acknowledged on November 4 and 5, 2025—so the dismissal can be reviewed on an accurate record. Because her opening brief is due imminently, and because the superior court has already declined to act, she respectfully asks this Court to resolve the motion promptly, on the papers.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. The parties, the underlying orders, and the renewal proceeding.

Appellant obtained a domestic violence restraining order against Respondent Michael Marraccini in 2018. The order was renewed in 2020, following a contested hearing, for an additional five years; neither the original order nor the renewal was ever vacated or reversed.

In July 2025, Appellant timely sought a further renewal under Family Code section 6345. Respondent retained attorney Omar Serrato of The Eagle Law Firm to oppose the renewal; attorney Rachel E. Juarez associated in as co-counsel on October 31, 2025. (Owens Decl. ¶ 3.)

After prior continuances, the renewal hearing was set for November 5, 2025, in Department 405A of the San Francisco County Superior Court before the Honorable Carolyn Gold, with Appellant ordered to appear in person. Appellant resides in Scottsdale, Arizona; her earlier requests to proceed without live testimony on documented medical grounds had been denied. Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the dismissal on December 4, 2025; the appeal is pending as No. A175236. (Owens Decl. ¶ 3.)

B. November 4: the court's reporter email, and Appellant's non-waiver and reliance.

On the morning of November 4, 2025, Department 405A emailed the parties (Owens Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. A):

“We are informed by the court reporter's department that there is a high chance there will be no court reporter coverage tomorrow. Since this is a DVRO trial, the court needs to continue the trial if any party doesn't waive the court reporter. In the alternative, any party could also hire a private reporter. ... Please check your email through the day up to early tomorrow for updates for court location and reporter status.”

Appellant promptly responded that she would not waive her right to an official court reporter and was not comfortable proceeding with a privately arranged reporter. She received no response. Understanding from the court's email that the matter would likely be continued absent her waiver, she canceled her planned travel to San Francisco and documented her reliance in writing the same morning. (Owens Decl. ¶¶ 5–6, Ex. A.)

C. Appellant was excluded from the reporter communications until after a private reporter had been secured.

Meanwhile, Mr. Serrato and court staff exchanged emails about securing a private reporter without including Appellant. At 10:10 a.m., Mr. Serrato asked court staff, “May we have a remote court reporter if we cant find someone to be there in person?” At 3:32 p.m., Deputy Clerk Geraldine Anderson asked him, “Is this reporter certified??” At 3:42 p.m., he confirmed that “we have successfully secured a court reporter for the proceedings scheduled

for tomorrow, November 5th.” Appellant was not copied on any of these communications; they occurred between the court and Respondent's counsel, without Appellant and in effect ex parte, and concerned the very question whether the hearing could lawfully proceed. (Owens Decl. ¶¶ 7–11, Ex. A.)

At 4:25 p.m., once she learned that a private reporter was being arranged, Appellant objected in writing to the appointment of Heather Bautista (CSR #11600) as reporter pro tempore, stating that her objection was “based on both procedural due process violations and good cause under Gov. Code § 68086(d)(2) and Cal. Rule of Court 2.956(c)(1),” and reiterating that she did not waive her right to an official court reporter and did not consent to a privately retained reporter. Court Manager Frances Yokota responded at 4:49 p.m., but her response did not acknowledge or address the objection or the non-waiver; it stated only that the matter “remains on calendar” and that the “[p]arties are to appear as previously court ordered.” (Owens Decl. ¶¶ 12–14, Ex. A.)

D. Directed to appear notwithstanding her objection, Appellant booked an urgent flight that evening.

Directed by the court's 4:49 p.m. email to appear the next morning—notwithstanding her pending objection and non-waiver—Appellant took immediate steps to comply. That evening, within hours and despite significant financial hardship, her family purchased a ticket for her on United flight UA1557, departing Phoenix at 6:25 a.m. the next morning (the eTicket issued at 7:20 p.m.), and Appellant sent the confirmation to the court. (Owens Decl. ¶ 15, Exs. A, B.)

E. November 5: Appellant was hospitalized before the hearing, notified the court twice, and offered HIPAA releases; court staff acknowledged both notices in writing.

Late that night and into the early morning of November 5, Appellant experienced repeated episodes of vomiting blood and went directly to the HonorHealth emergency department, where she was admitted. (Owens Decl. ¶¶ 16–17.) In the early morning hours, well before the 9:00 a.m. hearing, she emailed the court, Mr. Serrato, Ms. Juarez, and Respondent (Owens Decl. ¶ 18, Ex. A):

“I am writing to inform the Court that I am unable to appear for today's DVRO trial due to a sudden and serious medical emergency. ... I experienced multiple severe medical episodes involving vomiting blood. ... I am currently at HonorHealth Hospital, where I am receiving IV fluids and where they are determining treatment for gastrointestinal bleeding. ... I can provide medical documentation confirming this as soon as it becomes available and am more than willing to execute HIPAA releases as well for the Court and opposing counsel regarding my visit to the hospital. These circumstances clearly establish good cause for a continuance ...”

At 7:11 a.m., Court Manager Yokota replied in writing: “Email received. Thanks.” Appellant sent a second update reporting that she was being admitted, would require a surgical procedure under anesthesia, and was not expected to be released until the following day. At 7:33 a.m.—still nearly an hour and a half before the 9:00 a.m. hearing—the court acknowledged again, in writing: “Good morning Ms. Owens. Email received. Thanks.” (Owens Decl. ¶¶ 19–21, Ex. A.) Appellant remained hospitalized overnight and underwent surgery under anesthesia on November 6. Her hospital records are attached to her declaration as Exhibits C and D. (Owens Decl. ¶ 22.) Neither the court nor either of Respondent's attorneys requested the offered verification before the dismissal. (Owens Decl. ¶ 23.)

F. The hearing: dismissal at 9:26 a.m., with no mention of the acknowledged emergency, and no order ever prepared.

The reporter's transcript shows that when the matter was called, the court noted that “Petitioner is not present,” appointed the privately retained reporter, observed that “this matter was set for 9:00 a.m., and it's 9:26,” and stated, “So at this time, the Court will be dismissing this matter. The petitioner is not present.” (RT 3:10–3:26.) Mr. Serrato and Ms. Juarez, both present and both copied on Appellant's emergency emails that morning, said nothing about the emergency; Mr. Serrato instead reserved a motion for attorney's fees and costs. (RT 3:28–4:4; Owens Decl. ¶¶ 24–25.) In a recorded interview on November 9, 2025, Mr. Serrato acknowledged receiving Appellant's emergency communications and explained: “We did not respond ... I didn't want to give her a chance to give her anything to respond to.” (Owens Decl. ¶ 25.)

The minute order records the dismissal and the dissolution of the temporary restraining order “[b]ecause of the non-appearance of Petitioner,” makes no reference to the emergency notifications, and closes: “No Order is prepared for today’s hearing.” No final order was ever prepared or entered; the minute entry is the only memorialization of the dismissal. None of the November 4–5 email communications appears in the court file. (Owens Decl. ¶ 26.)

G. Post-dismissal events: counsel’s recorded statements, the withdrawn \$109,633.98 fee motion, and public media appearances.

On November 18, 2025, in a publicly posted interview, Mr. Serrato said of this appeal: “I’m not worried about her appeal. Let her appeal. Luckily because the judge didn’t make us make a record, her options for appeal are severely limited. An uphill battle for her.” (Owens Decl. ¶ 28.)

Respondent also sought to recover attorney’s fees arising from the dismissal. On April 29, 2026, he filed a motion under Family Code section 6344 seeking \$109,633.98 in fees and costs, set for hearing on July 20, 2026. The motion was supported by two things: a billing statement submitted under penalty of perjury, and a declaration from a purported eyewitness, Kristin Hardin. Both were demonstrably false, as Appellant showed in a written objection served on May 6, 2026.

A lawyer’s billing statement is supposed to be a running record, created as the work is actually performed. This one could not have been. Although its entries bear dates in August 2025, several of them describe events that had not yet happened as of those dates—meaning the statement was not the contemporaneous record it was presented to be. Three entries make the point plain. An entry dated August 6, 2025 bills for “review” of a criminal indictment against Appellant, and identifies that indictment by a case number that did not come into existence until November 5, 2025—three months after the entry’s date—so there was nothing under that case number to review on August 6. An entry dated August 19, 2025 bills for research on a bankruptcy “adversary proceeding,” but Appellant’s bankruptcy was not filed until December 2025, and the adversary proceeding not until January 9, 2026—months after the billed date. And an entry dated August 14, 2025 bills for a conference with co-counsel, but the co-counsel in question, Ms. Juarez, did not join the case until October 31, 2025. A statement

that bills in August for work defined by events occurring months later cannot have been kept when the work was supposedly done.

The Hardin declaration was the only evidence offered to support the fee motion's central premise—that Appellant had faked the medical emergency that kept her from court. In it, Kristin Hardin claimed to have seen Appellant and her horse at a horse show in Scottsdale, Arizona on October 21 and 22, 2025. That could not have occurred. The official show records of the United States Equestrian Federation, together with Appellant's contemporaneous horse-transport records, establish that Appellant's horse did not arrive at the show grounds until October 22, did not compete until October 23, and that Appellant herself did not arrive until October 23. Appellant had warned Mr. Serrato in writing on January 15, 2026—before he filed the declaration—that Ms. Hardin had no personal knowledge of her whereabouts.

Separately, the fee motion asserted that Appellant's bankruptcy case had been dismissed, and argued on that basis that the automatic bankruptcy stay under title 11 United States Code section 362 no longer barred Respondent from pursuing fees. That assertion was incorrect: Appellant's bankruptcy had not been dismissed and remained pending, so the stay remained in effect. One day after Appellant served her May 6 objection, on May 7, 2026, Respondent withdrew the fee motion “without prejudice” and filed a document titled “Procedural Posture Correction” addressing his representation about the status of the bankruptcy. Respondent did not, however, correct the billing statement or the Hardin declaration; the Hardin declaration remains on the superior court's docket uncorrected. (Owens Decl. ¶ 27.)

Respondent and his attorneys also publicized the case. Counsel appeared in interviews characterizing the dismissal as a decision on the merits and suggesting the 2018 and 2020 orders had been undone—though those orders were never vacated. Respondent himself, with his wife, appeared in a segment broadcast by Inside Edition, in which he stated that Appellant's abuse allegations were false and denied ever physically abusing or threatening her, while the segment told viewers only that the restraining order “was dismissed after Laura Owens failed to show up to a recent court hearing” and omitted that the order was granted in 2018, renewed in 2020 after a contested hearing, and never found to have been based on false allegations. That segment reached approximately 1.3 million viewers. By denying the abuse and presenting the

dismissal as a vindication while omitting the 2018 and 2020 history, Respondent conveyed the impression that the prior findings of abuse against him had been invalidated—though those findings were never vacated, reversed, or found to be false. The resulting publicity generated public support for Respondent, including an online fundraiser that raised \$101,722 for his legal fees. These appearances were followed by a wave of harassing messages directed at Appellant. (Owens Decl. ¶ 29.)

H. Appellant diligently sought this relief in the superior court, which—after more than a month—rejected the motion and directed her to this Court.

Appellant did not delay in seeking correction of the record; the delay was caused by the superior court's handling of her motion. The sequence is as follows. On June 7, 2026, Appellant submitted to the San Francisco County Superior Court a motion to correct and augment the record seeking the same relief sought here. The clerk accepted the motion itself but rejected the accompanying declaration and exhibits on a purely technical electronic-filing ground—that the attachments were not linked to their leading document (“THE COURT CANNOT ATTACH YOUR DOCUMENTS FOR YOU. PLEASE HAVE YOUR ATTACHMENTS CONNECTED TO THEIR LEADING DOCUMENT ...”). Appellant promptly corrected the formatting and resubmitted the motion with its supporting papers. Then, on July 9, 2026—more than a month after her original submission—the clerk rejected the motion outright, this time directing: “Please file your motion with the reviewing court — Court of Appeal.”

The superior court thus first signaled it would process the motion (accepting the lead document on June 7), then, a month later, refused it and redirected Appellant here. That month elapsed through no fault of Appellant, who acted promptly at every step, and it has compressed the time remaining before her opening brief is due. Having been turned away from the superior court despite her diligence, Appellant now asks this Court to exercise its own authority over the record on appeal, and to do so on an expedited basis. (Owens Decl. ¶ 30.)

III. THIS COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO AUGMENT AND CORRECT THE RECORD

This Court may, on motion or on its own, order the record augmented to include any document filed or lodged in the superior court, and may order the correction of any part of the record that is incorrect. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.155(a), 8.155(c), 8.340.) Where a document that was before the superior court is not in the clerk's file, this Court may direct the superior court to settle and correct the record so that it conforms to what actually occurred. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(c).) And where the interests of justice require, this Court may take additional evidence and make factual findings. (Code Civ. Proc., § 909; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252(b), (c).) These powers exist in addition to the court's inherent authority to control its process and ensure the accuracy of its records. (Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a).)

The completeness of the record is a precondition to meaningful appellate review. As the Supreme Court has explained, an adequate record of the trial court proceedings is “crucial” to a party's ability to obtain review, and its absence can leave even meritorious claims of error unreviewable. (*Jameson v. Desta* (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 599, 608–609.) A reviewing court that cannot see what the trial court knew cannot determine whether the trial court abused its discretion.

IV. ARGUMENT

A. The record should be augmented, or the superior court directed to correct it, to include the November 4–5 communications and supporting documents.

The materials described in sections II.B through II.E are the contemporaneous written communications of November 4 and 5, 2025—messages the superior court itself sent, received, and answered—together with the flight confirmation and the hospital records substantiating the emergency. (Owens Decl. ¶¶ 4–23, Exs. A–D.) They are not new evidence assembled for appeal; they are what was actually before the court when it ruled. They go directly to the questions the dismissal presents: what the court knew when it dismissed, whether Appellant's absence was willful or excused, and whether a brief continuance—rather than dismissal and dissolution of a protective order—was the appropriate response. The illness of a party is recognized good cause for a continuance. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c).)

Because these communications were transmitted to the superior court by email and were not placed in its file, and because the superior court declined to add them, Appellant requests that this Court either (1) order the record augmented to include them under rule 8.155(a) and direct the superior court to lodge them nunc pro tunc as of the dates received; (2) direct the superior court to settle and correct the record to include them under rule 8.155(c); or (3) receive them as additional evidence under Code of Civil Procedure section 909 and rule 8.252. However the relief is styled, the substance is the same: these materials were before the court that dismissed the case, and the court reviewing that dismissal should be able to see them.

B. The November 5 minute order—the only memorialization of the dismissal—should be corrected.

Because no final order was ever prepared, the minute entry is the entire official account of the disposition. As written, it records the effect—“non-appearance”—while omitting the cause the court had already acknowledged in writing: a hospitalization, then in progress, communicated to the court twice before the hearing. Appellant requests that this Court order the record corrected, or direct the superior court to correct the minute order, to reflect (1) the court's pre-hearing receipt and written acknowledgment of the medical-emergency notifications, and (2) Appellant's written objection and non-waiver of a court reporter. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(c).) Correcting the record does not disturb the disposition; it conforms the record to the truth, as fairness to a self-represented family law litigant requires. (*Elkins v. Superior Court* (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1357–1358, 1368.)

C. Completing the record is essential to meaningful review—a prejudice Respondent's counsel has described on camera.

The prejudice from the incomplete record is not speculative; the party who benefits from it has described it publicly. Mr. Serrato's statement that, “[l]uckily,” the absence of a record leaves Appellant's appellate options “severely limited,” together with his acknowledgment that counsel deliberately chose not to respond to the emergency communications, confirm that the record as it stands conceals rather than presents the facts this Court would need. (Owens Decl. ¶¶ 25, 28.)

The stakes reach the merits Appellant never got to present. Renewal of a DVRO turns on the protected party's reasonable apprehension of future abuse, and conduct short of physical violence can strongly support renewal. (*Lister v. Bowen* (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 319, 332–335; Fam. Code, §§ 6320, 6345.) That inquiry was never reached: the request was dismissed, and the protective order dissolved, twenty-six minutes into the calendar, while the protected party was in a hospital bed the court knew about. A record that omits those facts converts a procedural dismissal into an effectively unreviewable merits outcome—precisely the result the completeness rules exist to prevent. (Cf. *In re Marriage of Carlsson* (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 281, 290–293.)

D. The post-dismissal filings and statements should be included as part of a complete record.

Appellant further requests that the record include Respondent's April 29, 2026 fee motion and its supporting exhibits, the May 7, 2026 withdrawal papers, and the “Procedural Posture Correction”—all filed in the superior court and therefore properly the subject of augmentation under rule 8.155(a). These materials bear on the consequences still flowing from the dismissal: the fee motion was withdrawn without prejudice, its refiling remains calendared for July 20, 2026, and its supporting papers include billing entries and a witness declaration whose defects Appellant documented before the withdrawal (see Owens Decl. ¶ 27). Appellant does not ask this Court to adjudicate those defects; she asks only that the papers evidencing them be part of the record so that the full consequences of the dismissal are before this Court.

E. Expedited, on-the-papers consideration is warranted.

This motion raises documentary questions only and requires no hearing. Expedition is not merely convenient; it is essential. Appellant's opening brief is due July 29, 2026, and the Court has advised that no further extensions of that deadline will be considered. Appellant must therefore write her opening brief on the record as it now stands unless this motion is resolved first. That record omits the very facts on which her appeal depends—what the superior court knew and had acknowledged when it dismissed her case. The delay that created this predicament was not of Appellant's making: she first sought this relief in the superior court on June 7, 2026, and did not receive the July 9, 2026 direction to file here until more than a month

later, leaving her to seek the same relief in this Court on a compressed schedule. Appellant has served this motion on Respondent's counsel, who may respond in writing. Prompt, on-the-papers resolution prejudices no one and is the only way to ensure that Appellant's single, non-extendable opportunity to brief her appeal is not spent on a record that conceals the dispositive facts. Appellant respectfully requests that the Court rule on this motion before July 29, 2026.

V. CONCLUSION

Appellant respectfully requests that the Court issue an order:

1. Augmenting the record on appeal to include the November 4–5, 2025 written communications and supporting documents identified in this motion and authenticated in the Declaration of Laura Owens (Exhibits A–D), and directing the superior court to lodge those materials nunc pro tunc as of the dates received; or, in the alternative, directing the superior court to settle and correct the record to include them (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155), or receiving them as additional evidence (Code Civ. Proc., § 909; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252);
2. Ordering the record corrected, or directing the superior court to correct the November 5, 2025 minute order, to reflect (a) the court's pre-hearing receipt and written acknowledgment of Appellant's medical-emergency notifications and hospitalization, and (b) Appellant's written objection and non-waiver of her statutory right to an official court reporter;
3. Augmenting the record to include Respondent's April 29, 2026 attorney's fee motion and supporting exhibits, the papers reflecting its May 7, 2026 withdrawal without prejudice, and the related “Procedural Posture Correction” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a));
4. Deciding this motion on the papers, on an expedited basis, and issuing its ruling before July 29, 2026, in light of the non-extendable briefing deadline; and
5. Granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: July 13, 2026

/s/ Laura Michelle Owens
Laura Michelle Owens
Petitioner and Appellant, In Pro Per

STATE OF CALIFORNIA California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District	PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District
Case Name: L.O. v. Marraccini	
Case Number: A175236	
Lower Court Case Number: FDV18813693	

1. At the time of service I was at least 18 years of age and not a party to this legal action.

2. My email address used to e-serve [REDACTED]

3. I served by email a copy of the following document(s) indicated below:

Title(s) of papers e-served:

Filing Type	Document Title
PROOF OF SERVICE - PROOF OF SERVICE	Proof of Electronic Service
DECLARATION - DECLARATION	Declaration + Exhibits A-D (FINAL)
MOTION - MOTION	Motion to Augment and Correct the Record (Court of Appeal)

Service Recipients:

Person Served	Email Address	Type	Date / Time
Omar Serrato The Eagle Law Firm	[REDACTED]	e-Serve	7/13/2026 7:55:57 PM
Laura Owens		e-Serve	7/13/2026 7:55:57 PM
Rachel Juarez Bersch Juarez LLP 273133		e-Serve	7/13/2026 7:55:57 PM

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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

7/13/2026

Date

/s/Laura Owens

Signature

Owens, Laura (Pro Per)

Last Name, First Name (PNum)

Law Firm